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Abstract: We examine the impact of Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) on market 
structure, productivity, and competitive advantage in British retail pharmacy. In contrast to 
influential studies, but consistent with contemporary and recent work, we show that the 
major multiples were able to ameliorate the negative growth impacts of RPM. Higher profit 
margins - principally from larger manufacturer discounts and backward integration – were 
used to fund initiatives aimed at boosting aggregate sales and economies of scale and scope. 
These relationships are explored using a recently-discovered national establishment-level 
survey of retail pharmacists’ costs and margins, together with internal data for Boots Ltd.  
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Introduction 
Some influential studies have argued that prior to the Second World War the growth of 
chain stores and other large-scale retail formats in Britain did not produce substantial 
productivity benefits and may even have acted to constrain retail productivity growth. 
Alfred Chandler argued in Scale and Scope that - owing to severe market segmentation in 
Britain between working and middle-class customers – large-scale retailers focused on 
selling a narrow range of goods to a mainly working-class customer base. They thus reaped 
economies of scale, through higher stock-turn, but failed to achieve economies of scope.i 
A later study by Stephen Broadberry is more pessimistic, finding that British labour, and 
total factor, productivity in distribution actually declined over the inter-war period. 
Broadberry partly attributes this to a deterioration in the competitive environment, owing 
to growing retail market concentration and the rise of resale price maintenance (RPM) for 
branded goods.ii 
 These findings are sharply at odds with contemporary and near-contemporary 
analyses of British retailing, which generally emphasise the productivity advantages of 
large-scale formats. For example J.B. Jefferys’ seminal 1954 study highlighted the impact 
of inter-war multiple retailers in generating economies of scale and scope and reducing 
segmentation between working and middle-class markets.iii Moreover, claims that the 
“professional” retail sector faced declining productivity are based on highly problematic 
data. Broadberry’s negative inter-war British retail labour productivity estimate was 
derived from aggregate data showing distribution employment growth outpacing output 
growth.iv However, this includes a growing “long tail” of subsistence retailers, who set up 
“front room” and other very small shops as a response to mass unemployment. Retail 
consultant O.W. Roskill estimated that in 1939, despite the reduction in unemployment 
from its peak levels of the early 1930s, there were still around 375,000 - 400,000 such 
shops, which probably outnumbered “professional” independent shopkeepers.v This is 
corroborated by a number of government-sponsored and other enquiries.vi  
Recent research on British interwar department and variety stores has found strong 
economies of scale and scope and substantial productivity growth.vii However, these 
sectors required a minimum scale of operation significantly above that of typical small 
retail establishments and thus do not provide a comparison for the whole of the retail firm, 
or store, size distribution. Moreover, these sectors were relatively weakly impacted by 
RPM, which grew sharply over the inter-war era to encompass around 30 percent of 
consumer expenditure on goods.viii RPM has been proposed as an important factor 
fossilising the market structure of retailing in the sectors it most strongly impacted on, by 
preventing multiples from expanding their market share through price competition.ix 
This study examines the inter-war evolution of a sector strongly impacted by RPM, 
retail pharmacy. Pharmacy was an important sector of retailing. Chemists and drug stores 
were estimated to account for 80-85 per cent of sales for proprietary and non-proprietary 
medicines (excluding dispensing); over 75 per cent of invalid and infant foods; and 59-65 
per cent of beauty preparations, perfumes, toiletries, and toothpaste and tooth brushes; 
while chemists and opticians accounted for 55-65 per cent of photographic goods.x RPM 
was particularly strong for most major classes of chemists’ goods. For example, Jefferys 
estimated that around 50-60 per cent of proprietary medicine sales in 1938 were subject to 
collective RPM, while a further substantial proportion were subject to RPM by their 
manufacturers.xi 
A major newly-discovered 1939 national census of retail pharmacists (excluding 
public companies), together with internal data from the market leader, Boots, enable us to 
examine how productivity varied for pharmacists across almost all the firm, and store-size, 
distribution. We first examine the evolution of the sector, the ways in which RPM 
influenced its growth and structure, and the strategies developed by major multiples to 
mitigate the impact of RPM on their sales and market share growth. We find that for Boots 
and (on the basis of limited available evidence) the other national chain, Timothy White 
and Taylors, profits were boosted by higher manufacturer discounts and backward 
integration into manufacturing. These major cost advantages were translated into retail 
sales growth via strategies of store expansion (both green field and acquisition), together 
with boosting customer flow by product range diversification and intensive promotional 
activity. Such activities enabled the national multiples (but not the independents) to avoid 
the scenario – predicted by the theory of imperfect competition – that the initial rise in 
pharmacists’ profits generated by RPM would stimulate market entry by new competitors, 
who would bid away the abnormal profits while further fragmenting the local and national 
market.xii 
 
Historical development 
The early development of retail pharmacy was characterised by efforts to gain professional 
privileges that would provide legislative barriers to competition from other retailers. The 
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [hereafter Pharmaceutical Society], founded in 
1841, secured legislation (the Pharmacy Acts of 1852 and 1868) to limit the use of titles 
such as “chemist” and “druggist” to people qualified under the Society’s examinations and 
prevent other retailers from selling goods scheduled as “Poisons” under the latter Act.xiii 
They also sought to prohibit retail pharmacists constituted as limited liability companies 
(“company chemists”), headed by non-qualified persons. However, a test case brought by 
the Society ended in an 1880 House of Lords appeal decision that companies were not 
constrained by these Acts, so long as the sale of poisons was undertaken by a qualified 
person.xiv Consequently, over the following 15 years more than two hundred retail 
pharmacy companies were established.xv  
The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed rapid vertical specialisation 
between manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing, largely driven by the growth of 
intensively advertised patent and proprietary (manufacturer-branded) medicines.xvi 
Proprietaries, which rapidly became the most important class of chemist’s goods, did not 
require the employment of a qualified chemist and reduced the importance of the chemist’s 
skills in making up medicines from ingredients. They thus markedly increased the scope 
for market entry by other retailers, such as grocers. This, together with a trend towards 
further diversification into new product lines such as photographic goods and opticians’ 
services, acted to further increase the importance of commercial, rather than pharmacy, 
skills for success in the chemists’ trade.xvii 
Independent chemists perceived a further major threat to their livelihoods - the new 
multiple pharmacy chains. Jefferys estimated that in 1890 there were only four pharmacy 
multiples with over 10 branches each: Boots, Timothy White, Taylor’s Drug Co., and W.T. 
Warhurst.xviii However, the following decades witnessed rapid expansion, as shown in 
Table 1.  Pre-1914 multiple pharmacy was mainly composed of local chains, together with 
a hand full of regional firms and one national name, Boots Ltd. Born in Nottingham in 
1850, Jesse Boot worked full-time in his family’s herbal medicine shop from the age of 13. 
He later moved into proprietary medicines, using a highly successful business formula of 
buying in bulk, undercutting local competitors and vigorously advertising low prices to 
boost stock-turn.xix He later established own brands to substitute for more expensive 
nationally advertised ones and employed advertising that directly attacked what he 
described as the high prices of the established pharmacy trade.xx 
[Table 1 near here] 
By the Edwardian era Boots were also beginning to emphasise services, even 
hosting art exhibitions at some of their largest stores.xxi This transition owed much to 
Florence Annie Rowe, who Jesse Boot married in 1886. Florence, who came from a 
retailing family, was responsible for the development of Boots’ “No. 2 department” – 
selling stationery, books, pictures, silverware and other “fancy goods”, and for introducing 
lending libraries and cafes into the larger stores.xxii This assisted Boots in developing large, 
departmentalised, stores, which were advertised as appealing to both “the classes and 
masses”.xxiii This was part of a conscious attempt to broaden Boots’ market segment beyond 
its original mainly working-class customer base.xxiv Rapid development of new stores, 
including the acquisition of various smaller chemist chains, increased Boots’ branch 
network to 180 shops by 1900 and 560 in 1914, while Boots’ manufacturing activities were 
also substantially expanded.xxv 
The major regional chains generally followed similar strategies to Boots. For 
example, Taylor’s of Leeds originally pursued a policy of cutting patent medicine prices to 
the bone and, where possible, pushing their own products – with staff incentivised via 
commission.xxvi Taylor’s, together with some other large chains such as Parke’s Drug 
Stores, later also followed Boots’ strategy of developing large, imposing, flagship stores, 
with a broad range of merchandise, including “fancy goods”. Best practice rapidly diffused 
between the large chains, partly owing to widespread “poaching” of staff.xxvii 
The independent pharmacy sector responded to the competitive threat from large-
scale retailers via lobbying for RPM, to remove their price advantage, and (unsuccessfully) 
for legislation to prohibit or restrict company chemists. In 1896 a small-scale London 
pharmacist, William Glyn-Jones, established the Proprietary Articles Trade Association 
[P.A.T.A.] one of the earliest successful collective attempts to enforce RPM. P.A.T.A. 
aimed to ensure an adequate profit rate for retailers and wholesalers of proprietary 
medicines (while securing their goodwill for the manufacturers and thus avoiding excessive 
substitution of branded medicines by cheaper products).xxviii P.A.T.A. was governed by a 
council of (originally) 30 members: comprising equal numbers of representatives of 
retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers. These established lists of prices for proprietary 
goods (set so as to offer a certain gross margin when purchased in ordinary quantities), 
published in their Anti-Cutting Record, circulated to all chemists and other traders holding 
patent medicine licenses.xxix 
 Retail trade associations were generally developed and dominated by the sector’s 
largest firms.xxx Conversely, P.A.T.A.’s structure reflected its origins as a “grass roots” 
movement, initially championed by independent traders rather than the sector’s major 
players. Pharmacists were relatively well-organized compared to other retailers, reflecting 
the control of entry to the profession by the Pharmaceutical Society’s apprenticeship 
system and statutory qualifying exams. Moreover, P.A.T.A was built on a pre-existing 
substructure of local chemists and druggists associations, with its conferences largely 
comprising delegates from these associations. The multiples were slower to fall into line; 
indeed Boots refused to join (though they eventually tacitly accepted P.A.T.A.’s prices).xxxi 
The scope of goods covered by P.A.T.A.’s lists grew rapidly, from 142 articles in 1897 to 
over 2,000 by the beginning of 1924. xxxii P.A.T.A. also broadened its scope to cover other 
categories of goods typically sold through pharmacists, especially toiletries. 
The inter-war era witnessed both a major extension in the volume of chemists’ 
merchandise subject to collective or individual RPM and higher price-maintained gross 
margins. The main hike in margins occurred in 1920, when P.A.T.A. used increased 
railway charges as grounds for raising retailers’ margins to at least 25 per cent (compared 
to around 20 per cent prior to the First World War) and wholesalers’ margins to 12.5 per 
cent. By 1939 P.A.T.A. aimed to secure retailer discounts of at least 25 per cent on 
proprietary medicines, surgical preparations, and disinfectants; 20-25 per cent on 
proprietary infant and invalid foods; and 33.3 per cent on proprietary perfumes, cosmetics, 
soaps, and other toiletries.xxxiii   
Yet the spread of RPM did not halt the growth of market concentration.  Multiple 
retailers increased their share of retail pharmacy sales from 10.0–12.0 per cent in 1910 to 
18.0-22.0 in 1925 and 33.0-37.0 in 1939 (compared to the multiples’ estimated share of 
total retail trade of 18.0-19.5 per cent).xxxiv There was also a marked increase in 
concentration; by the late 1930s two firms – Boots, and Timothy White and Taylors - 
collectively controlled some 90 per cent of branches for multiple pharmacy stores with 25 
or more branches.xxxv In March 1939 Boots had 1,195 branches, with 14,055 branch staff, 
while the Timothy Whites & Taylors group had some 768 branches.xxxvi The sector was 
thus transformed into a duopoly of national chains, together with a large number of single-
branch enterprises and small multiples (plus department stores and co-operatives, with 
1939 market shares of 2.5-4.0 and 3.0-4.5 per cent respectively).xxxvii Rising market 
concentration was also evident in other heavily price-maintained sectors selling fast-
moving goods, such as groceries.xxxviii We now examine the ways in which the major 
multiples were able to substantially expand market share, despite being unable to engage 
in price competition for most of their manufacturer-branded goods.  
 
Strategies for expanding market share under RPM 
Retailers typically analyse their performance using the Gross Margin (the price mark-up, 
minus shrinkage and subsequent mark-downs), the Total Expenses ratio, and the Net 
Margin (Gross Margin minus Total Expenses), all expressed as a proportion of net retail 
sales. It is generally assumed that firms aim to maximise the growth of aggregate profits 
(possibly subject to the constraint of some minimum acceptable Net Margin), which in turn 
approximates to turnover multiplied by Net Margin. For any given Net Margin and level 
of total merchandise stocks, turnover is determined by stock-turn (the number of times their 
stores turn over stock each year).xxxix 
Scale economies in purchasing, from volume discounts and cutting out the 
wholesaler, act to increase Gross Margin for large-scale retailers (assuming they charge the 
same prices as their smaller competitors). However, mass retailers generally find it 
profitable to cut prices in order to boost stock-turn and market share, to an extent which 
typically more than counter-acts the positive impact on Gross Margin of purchasing 
economies, leaving them with a lower Gross Margin than smaller competitors. Meanwhile, 
their Total Expenses ratios are reduced via firm- and store-level economies of scale and 
scope, better inventory control, and the greater customer flow generated by lower prices, 
prime retail pitches and strong retail branding, which may enable them to achieve higher 
Net Margins, despite substantially smaller Gross Margins. 
 Assuming that effective RPM applies to all their merchandise, large-scale retailers 
would be compelled to sell at competitors’ prices, but would still enjoy significant 
discounts for bulk purchase. Moreover, their high and relatively stable Gross Margins 
would incentivise them to integrate backwards into manufacturing – as the returns from 
investment in own-brand goods would be higher, while the risk associated with that 
investment (from price wars and similar downward pressure on margins) would be lower. 
Carlo Morelli has argued that this reduction in risk was a particularly important motivation 
for grocery chain investment in own brands over 1954-64.xl Major pharmacy chains had 
strong advantages over their smaller rivals regarding own brands, as drug R&D, 
manufacture, and advertising are subject to economies of scale and scope. Furthermore, 
consumer acceptance of pharmacy private labels was particularly reliant on promotional 
expenditure and strong retail branding, to persuade customers that these were at least 
equally safe and effective as intensively-advertised proprietary brands. 
Thus, in contrast to competitive price-setting, multiples could be expected to have 
markedly higher, rather than lower, Gross Margins than smaller competitors. They would 
still enjoy efficiency savings in Total Expenses, thus producing a much larger net margin. 
However, their growth of total profits and market share might be expected to be lower, as 
customers would have no price incentive to choose them over less efficient competitors 
(for manufacturer-branded goods), and stock-turn would thus be substantially reduced. 
Moreover, RPM prices were typically set at levels sufficiently high to keep small retailers 
in business (given that manufacturers considered RPM valuable partly as a means of 
maximising their number of points of sale).xli 
 There were, however, a number of strategies whereby large pharmacy chains could 
translate their higher profit rates – from manufacturer discounts, own brands and scale 
economies – into aggregate sales and market share growth. These can be classified into two 
broad categories: increasing customer flow at their existing points of sale, by incentivising 
customers to visit their stores (despite the convenience advantages of more local 
competitors, selling manufacturer-branded goods at identical prices); and strategies aimed 
at expanding their number of points of sale. 
 These have been explored in the post-1945 RPM literature. Burt and Sparks set out 
a ‘spiral of growth’ model, whereby larger retailers use their higher Net Margin (from 
greater purchase discounts and high margin own brand sales) to develop in-store services 
and facilities. These reduce Net Margin, but increase stock-turn by attracting additional 
customers. If successful, this would have a similar effect to price reductions in raising sales 
growth and sales per square foot, thus lowering unit costs (both in-store and across the 
organisation as a whole) and improving asset utilization, providing additional funds for 
continued improvements in services and facilities to further boost growth.xlii   
 This literature identifies the ability of large retailers to secure preferential terms 
from manufacturers, and to develop strong home brands, as important drivers of industry 
concentration, both through ‘organic’ growth’ (the development of new branches) and the 
acquisition of smaller competitors.xliii RPM also makes expansion further down the retail 
hierarchy more attractive (especially for firms with saturated coverage of urban shopping 
centers), by offering attractive Gross Margins (further boosted by purchase discounts and 
home branding), to offset the lower store-level scale economies of shops serving smaller 
catchment areas.xliv 
  
Market growth strategies for Boots and Timothy White and Taylors  
Boots’ product selection, stock control, and inventory management systems received 
significant up-grading following its acquisition by U.S.-based United Drug Co. in 1920 
(when an elderly and infirm Jesse Boot felt unable to continue running the business). 
United Drug Co. introduced American-style managerial systems, including profit-sharing 
remuneration for senior executives, advanced systems of statistically-based expense and 
stock control (which also provided performance benchmarks for individual stores) and 
geographic division of stores into territories, supervised by territorial general managers.xlv  
However, following the initial reorganization American control proved fairly arms-length, 
with most senior managers being drawn from Boots staff. In 1932 a struggling United Drug 
Co. (now part of the larger Drug Incorporated) sold Boots back into British control, under 
a consortium headed by Jesse Boot’s son John (who had remained a senior executive during 
the period of American control).xlvi Boots experienced significant growth over the inter-
war years. Total sales (including a small amount of wholesale business) rose from 
£8,308,963 in the year to 31st March 1923, to £12,913,485 in the year to 31st March 1938, 
while store numbers increased from 665 to 1,180. 
By 1929 there was effectively only one other large pharmacy multiple, the cluster 
of firms controlled by the financier Philip Hill, which were later formally merged into 
Timothy Whites and Taylors Ltd. Taylors Drug Co. Ltd - then operating 162 branches and 
a large factory -was purchased by a group controlled by Hill in 1927. Later that year Hill 
acquired Needhams Ltd (127 branches). Then in June 1928 Hill  obtained control over 
Timothy White, operating 100 stores, which then acquired Hopes, Ltd, a chain of 32 
hardware shops. Later in 1928 Hill made further acquisitions: Messrs. Parkes of London 
(42 stores) and Mortons Cash Chemists Ltd (22 stores) which, together with subsequent 
acquisitions in and around London, were incorporated as Taylors Cash Chemists (London), 
Ltd.xlvii Hill was chairmen of these companies, which undertook considerable co-operation 
before their formal amalgamation in 1935. xlviii  The group had factories and warehouses in 
London, Leeds, and Portsmouth. Store management was divided territorially, with 
Territorial Group Managers controlling approximately 200 branches each, and a lower tier 
of Group Managers each supervising 35 branches.xlix 
Timothy White and Taylors had some 764 stores by the beginning of 1938.l Those 
inherited from Timothy White were mainly ‘dual’ shops, selling chemists goods and 
hardware, with separate windows devoted to each; the group included 155 of these, plus 
34 purely hardware stores.li There are no available figures for group turnover, though the 
firm claimed to have served almost 66 million customers during the year to 31st January 
1938, which (assuming identical sales per customer) suggests that their sales amounted to  
around 39 per cent of the business conducted by Boots. However, their substantial 
hardware interests would have reduced their relative share of trade in chemists’ goods.lii 
Boots and (on the basis of the much more limited available evidence for this group) 
Timothy White and Taylors, reaped major profit advantages through higher purchase 
discounts and backward integration. Some manufacturers offered the same sliding scale of 
discounts for bulk purchases to both wholesalers and retailers; given that wholesaler 
margins were around 12.5–15 per cent in 1938, this provided major purchase cost 
advantages.liii However, own brand merchandise offered even more attractive margins. The 
national multiples had much stronger manufacturing capabilities than the independents, as 
changes in pharmaceutical technology, involving complex organic chemicals and 
biological products unsuitable for small-scale manufacture, imposed a significant 
minimum efficient scale of output for many new medicines.liv Meanwhile national sales 
made it practicable to produce a much broader range of medicines in-house, while strong 
retail brands increased public acceptance of own label goods. 
Own brands offered not only higher margins but control over retail prices and 
“exclusivity” – which was a significant advantage for some prestigious own brands, 
supported by extensive press advertising, such as Boots No. 7 beauty preparation range. 
Boots’ significantly increased its proportion of own brand goods, capitalising on heavy 
investments in R&D. In 1915 Boots established a Fine Chemical Department to meet war 
needs and substitute for products hitherto imported from Europe. Following the post-
Armistice downturn in the fine chemical market Boots’ Research Department was reduced 
to three or four chemists. However, investment in pharmaceutical research continued.  For 
example, shortly after the isolation of insulin in 1921 a Boots’ chemist, Joseph Marshall, 
was sent to obtain process details for its extraction and in 1923 Boots’ Research 
Department began work on insulin and arsphenamine. Over the next four years the 
department substantially increased its range of pharmacological and bacteriological 
activities.  This was further boosted in 1927 by the appointment of a new research director, 
Dr F.H. Pyman, who brought five postgraduate chemists with him from Manchester, 
facilitating a further expansion of activities.lv 
The value of Boots’ manufacturing supplies to retail increased by 76.2 per cent 
between the years ending 31st March 1925-1938, substantially out-pacing their 40.7 per 
cent growth in retail sales.lvi The ratio of manufacturing supplies to retail (before adding 
wholesale and retail margins) to total store turnover (at retail prices) rose steadily from 
15.8 per cent in the year to 31st March 1925 to 17.8 per cent in the year to 31st March 1932. 
It then leapt to over 21 per cent for the next four years, while falling back to an average of 
just over 19 per cent during 1937-39. However, a better comparison is provided in the notes 
to Boots’ internal accounts, which provide data (from the year ended 31st March 1936 
onwards) at retail prices. 
In the year to 31st March 1939 Boots’ pharmaceutical manufacturing activities 
generated retail sales of £3,937,572, representing 47.5 per cent of sales in merchandise 
classes that included proprietary medicines (“packed goods”, drugs, and dispensing). 
Moreover, while Boots achieved a Gross Margin of 36.1 percent on proprietary articles, its 
Gross Margin on own goods in these classes amounted to 62.1 percent. However, these 
incurred extra costs of advertising and sales commission; an analysis for the previous year 
indicated that if these were factored in the Gross Margin on own goods would fall from 
62.77 per cent to something in excess of 52.7 per cent.lvii Timothy White and Taylors also 
developed a wide range of own brands, including medicines under Gee’s, Magors, and 
other brand names; toilet requisites under the Shahls brand, and Gordon brand hardware 
lines and cleaning agents.lviii 
Maximising sales for own brand products entailed generating confidence in both the 
company’s retail brand and in their specific own brands, especially for pharmaceuticals, 
which were “credence” goods, with a history of quackery and dubious practice - 
encompassing both retail own brands and well-known proprietary names, such as 
Beechams.lix Boots invested in extensive “goodwill” advertising to promote their 
reputation for high quality medical supplies and advice. Adverts focused on the quality of 
their analytical laboratories, in contrast to the more dubious methods of some drug 
producers, with slogans such as “YESTERDAY … a tiny herbalist’s Today … A GREAT 
LABORATORY where you are protected from unsafe drugs …” or “Manufactured by 
Boots… a guarantee of safety and accuracy.”lx  
In 1922 Boots appointed P.C. Brett as their first medical advisor. Brett (who became 
a director in 1926) made valuable contacts with St. Thomas’s Hospital, which fed into 
research projects. He also contributed to the development of the firm’s own brands. Boots 
employed testimonials from doctors (and built up goodwill with medical staff by offering 
them discounts), and publicized the advice services their stores offered with adverts such 
as “ASK NURSE! You’ll find her in the Surgical Department of the larger Boots shops 
ready to help you with your more personal purchases.”lxi Given that, like doctors, 
pharmacists provided diagnostic services to consumers who might be unsure of either their 
ailment and/or the best medication for it, the ability of Boots to position itself as a highly 
trusted and respected source of medicines and advice (which, by the 1920s, was justified 
by its investment in modern R&D and production facilities) provided it with a major 
reputational advantage over smaller competitors.lxii 
Boots further enhanced their corporate image by investing heavily in the 
development and promotion of prestigious new product brands carrying the firm’s name.lxiii 
One outstanding example was Boots “No. 7” series of deluxe beauty preparations. The 
perfumer Pierre Bongard was recruited from Paris to produce new fragrances; packaging 
was designed by the prestigious Carlton Studios, and the leading beauty writer Mrs 
Darlymple was engaged to help with publicity. Boots invested substantially in the product 
launch, training “Number 7 girls” who toured their stores, arranging stock and giving 
special demonstrations (in the stores, leading local hotels, and the Ideal Home Exhibition). 
Beauty parlors were also launched in the larger stores to promote the range – which both 
became one of Boots’ most successful and enduring brands and helped raise the firm’s 
overall reputation in the beauty products field.lxiv No.7 also provided Boots with exclusivity 
for what became a prestigious product brand. 
The wider range of goods available in the national multiples’ larger stores, their open 
display, and freedom to browse, were also important service attractions.lxv For example, 
during the 1920s Boots continued its tradition of developing some large departmentalised 
stores, including five  “Wonder Shops” - combining state of the art shop design and 
amenities such as fitted kitchens, first aid stations, ballrooms and ladies’ retiring rooms – 
while also being designed to tastefully blend into the local streetscape.lxvi  
Both the national multiples substantially diversified their product ranges, thus 
drawing in more customers and boosting utilisation rates for their sales floorspace. Boots 
developed two particularly distinctive offerings: lending libraries and cafes. In March 1939 
there were some 460 libraries, and 19 cafes, among Boots’ 1,195 branches.lxvii An internal 
analysis found that their libraries were only generally profitable in larger stores, which 
could attract over 1,500 subscribers. However, their presence in many stores where they 
were not directly profitable (which comprised 319 or the 423 branches operating for two 
years or more in 1938) reflected both firm-level scale economies in bulk purchasing of 
books and the fact that they boosted the stores’ other sales.lxviii 
A similar rationale underpinned their provision of cafes at a few very large stores, 
reflecting a strategy also pursued by some other major high street chains, such as 
Woolworths and Marks & Spencer (who, like Boots, found that cafes were not justified 
solely in terms of direct profitability).lxix However, the decreasing average size of new 
Boots stores placed a constraint on the proportion that could offer these extra lines and 
services.lxx Reaping economies of scope may also have underpinned the development of 
dual chemists and hardware stores by Timothy Whites – a strategy extended to the group 
as a whole following their merger with Taylors. 
Own brands, cafes, libraries, and new, non-pharmacy, product lines were also 
important as means to differentiate retail brands, given that differentiation by price was 
generally not permitted.lxxi The Boots Library could also be seen as an early form of 
“loyalty-related initiative”, providing benefits that necessarily entailed return visits.lxxii 
Boots and Timothy White and Taylors were also active in expanding their points 
of sale, through both acquisitions and “green field” store development. A strategy of 
corporate acquisition was vigorously pursued by what became the Timothy White and 
Taylors’s group, under the guiding influence of Philip Hill (who also, unsuccessfully, made 
a bid for Boots in 1932). This was assisted by the fact that that, apart from Boots, the other 
major chains of the early 1920s were regionally-based firms, with little territorial overlap 
with each other. Boots’ inter-war expansion strategy also placed increased emphasis on 
buying going concerns, though these were typically single store or other relatively small 
businesses. This was more expensive than buying vacant premises, but allowed Boots to 
obtain local goodwill, diffused tensions with independent pharmacists - a particularly vocal 
and well-organised group – and had the advantage of reducing inter-firm competition.lxxiii  
Both companies also expanded via diffusion down the retail hierarchy, through 
opening new branches. At the end of 1923 Boots had 665 stores, with average sales per 
store of £12,495; by 31st March 1938 they had 1,180 stores and average sales per store of 
£10,413.lxxiv Timothy White and Taylors also supplemented their strategy of corporate 
acquisitions with a complementary policy of new store development. For example, from 
27th September 1936 to 1st January 1938 they opened 19 new ‘dual’- (chemist and 
hardware) shops and one single function chemist shop.lxxv The aim of both companies was 
to develop stores of optimal size for their local catchment areas and each thus also engaged 
in significant programmes of store extension and modernization in locations where market 
conditions justified this.lxxvi 
 
The independent chemist under RPM 
The number of small-scale chemists (with 10 or fewer branches) rose from 9-10,000 in 
1914 to 12-13,000 in 1938.lxxvii Rapid growth continued into the 1930s, with the 
Pharmaceutical Society census identifying an 18 per cent increase in the number of 
chemists’ stores between 1930 and 1937.lxxviii The pharmacist’s apprenticeship system –
requiring trainees to serve under a qualified pharmacist while undergoing academic 
training, culminating in qualifying exams - acted to proliferate the number of retail outlets. 
Pharmacists found it financially attractive to take on apprentices, but could not generally 
offer them jobs after qualification; the typical outcome being that they set up a (often under-
capitalised) pharmacy store on their own account. 
Meanwhile independent chemists faced a progressive erosion in the value of their 
technical skills, owing to the continued expansion of proprietary medicines relative to cures 
made up by the pharmacist from raw ingredients. Medical practitioners were said to 
increasingly prescribe proprietaries rather than write out prescriptions for generic 
medicines, even when these could be easily compounded in-store.lxxix Furthermore, 
intensive advertising increased the tendency for customers to demand a specific brand, 
rather than explaining their symptoms to the chemist. Pharmacists’ margins were protected 
by RPM, yet the absence of any requirement for a trained pharmacist when selling 
proprietary medicines resulted in other retailers being drawn to these goods by their 
attractive margins.lxxx Conversely, the Pharmaceutical Society report noted that intensive 
advertising for branded and proprietary goods had contributed to substantial aggregate 
growth in medicine sales.lxxxi  
The independents had one major advantage – convenience – which was more 
important for chemist goods that for merchandise involving infrequent major purchases 
(such as clothing) or multiple item purchases (such as groceries). Many independents 
sought to increase turnover by diversifying into related goods, such as toiletries, perfumes, 
cosmetics, and beauty products. However, given that these also typically had high, price-
maintained, gross margins, they again faced growing competition from non-pharmacy 
stores.lxxxii Photographic goods was another growing area of business and here pharmacists 
proved more successful in holding their traditional dominant position, assisted by 
manufacturers who sought to limit the number of sales points.lxxxiii Yet the broadening 
product mix and greater emphasis on commercial skills and assets - including merchandise 
display, shop design, and well-located stores - raised overhead charges, requiring more 
rapid stock-turn to maintain net profits.lxxxiv  
Despite protection from the full force of market competition through RPM and, for 
some lines, by the requirement for professional qualifications, Roskill noted a trend for 
pharmacists’ salaries to decline towards levels prevailing in other branches of retailing - as 
predicted by the theory of imperfect competition, as applied to RPM, discussed earlier.lxxxv 
The Pharmaceutical Society also concluded that independent pharmacists faced declining 
profit rates (though a survey question regarding the trend of profits over 1930-37 produced 
inconclusive results) and – despite their growing absolute sales - a declining proportion of 
the total pharmacy trade.lxxxvi  
The Pharmaceutical Society suggested developing ‘voluntary chain’ type 
arrangements, whereby pharmacists would co-operate in areas such as purchasing stock, 
uniform pricing, using standard shop fronts and equipment to create a corporate brand, and 
joint provision of advertising and other services. However, they were deeply skeptical 
regarding whether the individualistic nature of most independent pharmacists would allow 
such co-operation.lxxxvii Most independents preferred to focus on renewed attempts to 
exclude non-pharmacy competitors. The most important initiative was the Chemists 
Friends Scheme, launched by the National Pharmacists Union in 1935.lxxxviii Manufacturers 
were asked to limit retail distribution of their proprietaries to pharmacists, compliant firms 
being placed on the “Chemists’ Friends” list. Participating retailers were in turn requested 
to give special prominence to their products.lxxxix However, the Pharmaceutical Society 
enquiry found that most items covered in the scheme had, in practice, previously only been 
sold by pharmacists, while the scheme had not materially increased the proportion of goods 
restricted to pharmacists (with the exception of some new products, where manufacturers 
needed their support to create a market).xc 
 
New data sources for retail pharmacists’ costs, margins, and productivity 
The absence of any British retail census before 1950 restricts performance analysis of retail 
establishments (other than department stores and Co-operatives) to those few major 
multiples that have surviving internal management accounting records. However, retail 
pharmacy is unique in that there was a national “census” covering all classes of independent 
and multiple pharmacists other than the two national chains. We use this census in 
conjunction with firm and store-level internal managerial accounting records from Boots 
Ltd, held in the Boots plc archives, to provide a performance analysis over the entire 
pharmacy size distribution (with the exception of Timothy White and Taylors, which has 
no suitable surviving data). To the best of our knowledge the data sources for this analysis 
have never been previously used in academic or other published work. 
 The census was conducted as part of the Pharmaceutical Society’s enquiry into the 
problems of the retail trade and how these could be addressed.xci Following an experimental 
census of 50 shops, all retail pharmacy stores were sent census forms in November 1938 
(receipt of returns being closed in February 1939), relating to their last full accounting years 
(mainly the year to 31st March 1938).xcii Only Boots and Timothy White and Taylor were 
excluded (presumably because it would be impossible to anonymise their data, given their 
much larger size, and that – as public companies – they would be unwilling to reveal such 
data).  
Approximately 12,500 census forms were sent out, of which 1,682 were returned, 
making this by far the largest pre-1950 British retail establishment survey. After rejecting 
forms that omitted essential data or appeared to have faulty arithmetic or implausible data, 
there were 1,254 usable responses.xciii  The enquiry’s committee believed that the replies 
were representative of pharmaceutical businesses as a whole. Unfortunately only the 
processed census, rather than the individual returns, have survived. 
In many cases the proprietor did not provide a figure for their salary and the average 
salary for the relevant turnover range was then used.xciv Salaries were strongly dependent 
on turnover; only stores with sales of £2,000 – 2,500 or more paid average salaries over 
£250 (equivalent to what was then considered the minimum threshold adult “middle-class” 
income). Some 54.9 per cent of stores in the census were below this size threshold, 
suggesting that the average retail pharmacist was positioned towards the bottom of the 
white-collar income spectrum.xcv Some 221 shops included in the census were branches of 
“multiples” of 2-30 stores, though just over half of these had only two shops. The census 
found that the multiples achieved substantially higher turnover per store, and gross and net 
margins, than single store firms.xcvi  
Data for Boots are derived from a number of accounting records. These include the 
“Statistical Record”, a series of annual report for the directors, providing extensive data on 
Boots’ firm-level performance and sales for years ending 31st March, with comparisons for 
earlier years; a series of detailed internal firm-level accounts, and notes to these accounts 
(again for years ending 31st March); and cards recording the performance of particular 
stores from 1923 onwards, with data for years ending 31st December.xcvii 
 Table 2 shows the bi-modal firm size distribution of the British pharmaceutical 
sector. There were 9,257 single store firms and some 1,354 very small multiples of 2-10 
stores (including 895 unincorporated retailers with an average of 2.41 shops and 459 
companies with an average of 2.99). There was only one larger unincorporated firm (with 
17 stores) and 20 companies with 11-50 stores (averaging 22.05 stores).xcviii  Then at the 
other end of the size distribution, though excluded from the Census, was Boots, with 1,195 
branches by March 1939, and Timothy Whites & Taylors, with 768 branches.xcix This 
hollowing out of firms in the middle size range may reflect the fact that small stores had 
the key advantage of convenience, while the national chains were in the strongest position 
to capitalise on economies of scale and scope. 
Table 3 provides an analysis of retail pharmacists’ sales by class of goods. 
Unfortunately the Census only provided rankings, rather than percentages of sales. We 
have added similar data for Boots, from their “Statistical Record” (again expressed as 
rankings, to make them consistent with the rest of the table). The table shows that 
comparison of large and smaller retailers is not substantially distorted by differences in 
product mix. In all cases proprietary medicines are the largest sales category, followed by 
either other medicines or toiletries and sundries, with photographic goods occupying fourth 
or fifth place. There is some tendency for the importance of National Health Insurance 
dispensing to fall as store size increases, while the main difference between Boots and the 
survey stores is Boots’ higher ranking for “other” items (reflecting its significant activity 
in fancy goods, stationery and art, and library and café facilities). However, this category 
accounted for only 14.7 per cent of Boots sales (reflecting the fact that they were mainly 
restricted to the larger stores). 
Table 4 examines the variation in margins and expenses for retail pharmacists by 
turnover, again with aggregate data for Boots added. The survey shows relatively little 
variation in gross margin by size of store, with a standard deviation across the size range 
of only 1.13 percentage points, as would be expected given the prevalence of RPM. 
However, expenses ratios show strong scale economies, falling from 37.9 per cent for 
stores with annual turnover of £500-1,000 to 26.2 per cent for stores with net sales of over 
£4,000. This appears to be strongly linked to faster stock-turn. Unfortunately, the survey 
does not disaggregate stocks from stocks and fittings, which prevents direct calculation of 
stock-turn rates. However, the ratio of stocks and fittings to turnover shows a very sharp 
decline, from 47.3 per cent for the smallest class of store to 30.2 per cent for stores with a 
turnover of £4,000-5,000 and 32.5 per cent for those with sales of over £5,000. 
Consequently net profit rates are strongly related to size, ranging from a slight loss for 
stores with under £1,000 turnover to 9.0 per cent for those with annual sales over £5,000.  
Table 4 also provides aggregate data for Boots, for the year to the end of March 
1938. Boots’ Gross Margin is shown to be significantly lower than that for any turnover 
band in the Pharmaceutical Society survey, reflecting the fact that the firm fixed gross 
margins on own brand goods at a relatively low level (30.5 per cent). Moreover, at least 
some of their discounts for manufacturer brand bulk purchases were internally allocated to 
their wholesale/warehousing division rather than to their retail division. 
Comparisons of Total Expenses and Net Margins are distorted, as Boots’ retail 
section took on some of the promotional costs of their own-brand goods, by paying 
commission to retail staff on their sales (as was noted by the firm’s accountants). If 
commission and bonus payments, which comprised 10.6 per cent of branch wages and 
salaries, are removed (to make the retail data comparable with stores selling externally-
sourced goods, for which promotional activity was undertaken by the manufacturer), the 
Total Expenses ratio would be reduced to 25.5 per cent and the retail Net Margin increased 
from 4.5 to 6.0 per cent.c However, this assumes that all Boots’ commission and bonus 
payments are made for own-goods sales and that, in their absence, fixed salaries and wages 
would be no higher.  
So the real comparative figure for Boots’ retail expenses lies somewhere between 
24.4 and 25.5 per cent, probably towards the lower end of this range. Following the same 
logic, their Net Margin would be nearer 6.0 than 4.5 per cent. However, this ignores the 
profits from Boots’ manufacturing and wholesale functions; which would further increase 
net profit, to 8.6 per cent of turnover. Yet even this figure is lower than that for the largest 
independent stores in the sample, with sales of over £5,000, which had a 9.0 per cent 
average Net Margin. Given Boots’ substantially greater average store size than even the 
largest turnover class in the census, this suggests that the positive relationship between 
store size and Net Margin shown in the census may not be evident for higher store turnover 
levels. The following section investigates this. 
 
The relationship between store size and performance at Boots 
Performance records have survived for a number of individual Boots stores, enabling 
examination of stores in common ownership – and, therefore, controlling for firm-level 
scale economies in areas such as purchasing, manufacturing, and central administration. 
These cover calendar years (rather than Boots’ accounting year, which was to the end of 
March) and incorporate wholesale, as well as retail, expenses. Table 5 shows key 
performance variables for the year to 31st December 1937 (the closest date to the 
Pharmaceutical Society census), arranging the stores into four quartiles, by turnover. Stores 
that opened or closed during the year were excluded (as their turnover figures would not 
cover the full year) and a small number of others had to be omitted owing to missing or 
dubious data (for example, where Gross Margin figures did not match the sum of operating 
expenses and net margin). This left a useable sample of 87 stores (with the highest quartile 
shown in the table having one fewer store than the others). 
 [Table 5 near here] 
The sample had substantially larger average sales per store (£15,571, compared to 
£10,840 for Boots’ retail section annual turnover per store to 31st March 1938). However, 
the range of store sizes matches that of the company, the smallest store in the sample having 
sales of £1,965 (almost identical to the average for Boots’ 20 smallest stores), and the 
largest having a turnover of £113,129 (considerably higher than the average for their 20 
largest stores) enabling us to draw inferences for the chain as a whole.ci 
As Table 5 shows, aggregate turnover for the sample was dominated by the top 
quartile, with average sales some six times as high as stores in the third quartile. This was 
true, to a lesser extent, for the company, with their 20 largest stores in March 1938 
accounting for 12.48 per cent of annual turnover for all 1,180 branches. These thus clearly 
played an important role in increasing Boots aggregate sales and generating company-level 
scale economies.cii  
Pay-roll expenses ratios declined significantly for larger stores. This data can also 
be used to estimate sales per employee, using the ratio of Boots’ retail section wages and 
salaries during the year to 31st March 1938, divided by the number of branch employees.ciii 
The figures show that sales per employee rose substantially with turnover, especially over 
quartiles 1-3. Larger stores are also shown to have reaped economies of scope, with sales 
per customer in the highest quartile being substantially above the others. However, the 
largest quartile incurred greater rental, and other non-labour, costs, collectively giving it a 
significantly higher Total Expenses ratio than Quartile 3. This in turn results in a 
significantly lower Net Margin for quartile 4 relative to quartile 3. Given the limited sample 
size (87 stores) in this analysis, a similar exercise was conducted for the year to 31st 
December 1938, with a useable sample of 88 stores that had a large overlap with, but was 
not identical to, the Table 5 sample. This corroborates the above findings, with the larger 
stores enjoying higher sales per member of staff, and per customer, but incurring higher 
Total Expenses, and lower Net Margins, than Quartile 3. 
The lower profit margins for Boots’ largest stores, relative to those in Quartile 3 
(which spanned Boots’ average sales per store), are consistent with the hypothesis that 
RPM diverted some trade from central to local points of sale. Large, central, stores incur 
high rental costs and typically have a broader product mix than smaller stores in the same 
chain (including many goods that have a lower stock-turn than the chain’s core lines, other 
things being equal). Such higher costs are typically offset by greater customer numbers, 
that boost overall stock-turn. However, under RPM customers might find it more 
convenient to make frequent small purchases from their local chemist, rather than waiting 
to make larger weekly purchases from a high-street store. This problem was recognized by 
Boots. A long-term trend of falling sales for some central stores in large cities - such as 
Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Newcastle, and Birmingham – was partly attributed to 
the opening of smaller Boots’ branches that encroached on their traditional catchment 
areas.civ 
The Boots store-level data provide a (unbalanced) sample of 151 stores over 1923-
1938, allowing us to look at the evolution of store size over time and the extent to which 
this is consistent with the growing influence of RPM. The sample composition is broadly 
representative of the population of Boots stores, with 41 stores entering from 1924 onwards 
(38.8 per cent more than were present at the beginning of the period), slightly lower than 
that for the full store population (43.6 per cent). 
Specifically, we would expect to find a shift in the stores’ size distribution. Figure 
1 illustrates the distribution of stores over time between four size categories [small, with 
sales of less than £5,000 per annum (denoted 1); small-medium with sales between £5,001 
and £10,000 per annum (2); medium-large with sales of £10,001 and £20,000 (3); and large 
stores with sales over £20,000]. The proportion of small stores grows from one quarter of 
the sample in 1923 to 55% 1931, stabilizing around 50% thereafter. The relative proportion 
of large stores remains quite stable, while the rise in the importance of small stores is 
mainly counter-balanced by falls in the proportions for the small-medium and medium-
large categories. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
The spread of RPM can be expected to progressively reduce the minimum threshold 
store size that Boots would consider, given that it acts to both reduce the optimal size of 
store and – at least in the short-term - increase the relative profitability of smaller stores. 
Figure 2 illustrates the shift in the relationship been size (in terms of sales) and net margin 
for three benchmark years. We find a non-linear relationship between the two variables, 
with the tangential point capturing the store size that has the highest profit margin. Figure 
2 also highlights that there was a reduction in maximum net margins from 18 per cent in 
1924 to about 8 per cent for the 1938 tangential point. This is consistent with the standard 
theory of imperfect competition, discussed earlier, which predicts that the abnormal profits 
generated by RPM will be progressively reduced across the sector by firm entry. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
In order to examine how these correspond to specific size categories we correlate 
the two variables at our four size groupings over the 1920s and 1930s. The correlations are 
highest for the 1920s for the smallest stores (those with less than £5,000 in sales) with net 
margins being high and positive at the 1% level of significance (0.503, p>0.01), while the 
next size category has a much smaller and statistically insignificant relationship between 
these variables. At the other end of the spectrum the larger stores (with sales between £10-
20,000 and over £20,000) have large negative correlations (0.283, p>0.01 and 0.304, 
p>0.01, respectively). The relationship between sales and net margins shifts in the 1930s, 
as shown in Table 6. Small stores’ net margins are still positively related, but the correlation 
coefficient has more than halved for the smallest group compared to the 1920s. Indeed, the 
optimum size of store now appears to be in the £5,000 – 10,000 turnover range (though 
negative returns are only slight over the £10,000 - £20,000 range and relatively low 
compared to the 1920s even for the largest stores). This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that Boots’ expansion of own brand sales reduced the cost penalty of operating large stores, 
relative to smaller ones, over the inter-war period. 
[Table 6 near here] 
 Our data also enable us to estimate the extent that Boots expanded their store 
network via store development or purchasing competitors. Direct information on whether 
stores were purchased or developed is unavailable, however we can infer this by examining 
the growth in store sales. We find a clear differentiation between stores with growth rates 
of more than 15 per cent in the year after they were established, presumably signifying new 
entrants, and those with growth rates below 15 per cent, which we assume to be acquired 
existing pharmacies. As discussed above, purchasing established firms was more expensive 
than buying vacant premises, but allowed Boots to obtain local goodwill, diffused tensions 
with independent pharmacists, and reduced inter-firm competition. The data reveal that the 
proportion of new entrants under this definition is about three quarters of the 41 stores, 
indicating that new store development was the primary strategy. This may have partly 
reflected expansion into new shopping areas, such as new-built suburban shopping parades. 
 
Conclusions 
The experience of independent pharmacists and very small chains under RPM 
conforms to the predictions of neoclassical imperfect competition theory. Despite gross 
margins that were high relative to most other sectors of retailing,cv and rising national 
consumer expenditure on chemists’ goods, small retailers nevertheless faced declining 
incomes owing to the rapid growth of local competition, both from pharmacists and other 
retailers.  
 Conversely, for the major national multiples the predictions of standard imperfect 
competition theory, as applied to RPM, do not hold. These enjoyed substantial firm-level 
scale and scope economies, from manufacturers’ discounts and backward integration into 
manufacturing. Increased profits generated by these advantages were translated into higher 
sales through strategies of intensive promotion (partly to strengthen corporate brands); 
store-based services; a more diverse merchandise assortment to draw in customers; and 
territorial expansion – through both pharmacy store acquisitions and ‘greenfield’ 
developments.  
The national retailers did face productivity penalties for their larger central stores, 
with declining returns to store size evident for branches with revenues much in excess of 
£10,000. This contrasts starkly with evidence on store-level scale economies in this period 
for sectors much less constrained by RPM. For example, recent studies of variety stores, 
drapers, and department stores indicate that substantial scale economies are evident even 
at very high turnover levels (well beyond the turnover of the largest Boots’ branches).cvi 
This reflects the negative impacts of RPM on customer flow for large, centrally-located 
stores, while high rental costs for central shopping pitches were determined in competition 
with retailers who were less constrained by RPM. Nevertheless, these large stores made a 
major contribution to total firm turnover and thus underpinned Boots’ strong firm-level 
scale and scope economies.cvii  
 RPM thus created a bi-modal industry structure, with an ‘independent’ sector 
(mainly comprising single store firms and very small multiples) witnessing substantial 
growth in store numbers, but declining market share, together with what became a duopoly 
of national chains that enjoyed both rising store numbers and substantial market share 
growth. Moreover, these national firms utilized their strong firm-level scale economies to 
expand further down the retail hierarchy, “cherry-picking” the most attractive local 
shopping pitches through both acquisitions and green-field investments. This process 
looked set, in the absence of government intervention, to eventually relegate the 
independents to a “fringe” of shopping pitches deemed uneconomic by the national 
multiples owing to their very small catchment areas.  
 RPM neither blocked the growth of large-scale retailing or the firm-level 
productivity advantages arising therefrom – though it did inhibit the store-level scale and 
scope economies evident in less price-controlled areas of multiple and department store 
retailing. Meanwhile there is little evidence that inter-war British retail pharmacists faced 
greater institutional barriers to competition, from RPM or other sources, than their overseas 
counterparts. Several European countries, including France and Germany, had well-
established systems of state intervention to control drug prices and quality; limitations on 
the number of pharmacists per head of local population; and/or more general legislative 
restrictions on the growth of large-scale retailers.cviii Even in the USA RPM for fast-moving 
goods had its widest application in the drug trade, having achieved almost complete 
coverage by the late 1930s. Moreover, U.S. drug retailers’ trade associations were more 
successful in pressing for restrictive legislation to reduce competition from the multiples 
than their UK counterparts.cix So while the scope of competition in British retail pharmacy 
was “constrained” relative to some other areas of retailing, these constraints were typically 
weaker than those facing pharmacists in most Western nations. 
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Table 1: Estimates of the number of firms in the chemists' and druggist' trade with 10 or 
more branches, 1895-1939 
 
 
 
Source: Jefferys, Retail Trading, p. 386. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Branches 10-24 25-49 50-99 100 or more Total
Year Firms Branches Firms Branches Firms Branches Firms Branches Firms branches
1895 4 54 2 74 1 50 0 -       7 178      
1905 9 115 1 36 1 78 1 314      12 543      
1915 7 96 1 38 3 228 1 579      12 941      
1920 10 149 1 36 3 241 1 618      15 1,044   
1925 13 189 2 67 0 0 4 1,137   19 1,393   
1930 16 204 3 98 0 0 3 1,439   22 1,741   
1935 20 269 3 85 2 110 2 1,816   27 2,280   
1939 22 316 5 155 1 58 2 1,933   30 2,462   
Table 2: The structure of the British retail chemist sector in 1938 
 
 
 
 
Source: Royal Pharmaceutical Library Archives, IRA 1996.432, Pharmaceutical Society 
of Great Britain, `Report of the Committee of Enquiry, Part I’ (May 1939). 
Branches             Firms             Stores
per firm No. %  No. %
1 9,257   87.05 9,257   61.21
2-10 1,354   12.73 3,529   23.33
11-50 21        0.20 458      3.03
51-500 0 0.00 0 0.00
Over 500 2          0.02 1,880   12.43
Total 10,634 100.00 15,124 100.00
Table 3: sales by category of merchandise, classified by order of magnitude (1 being the largest category) for 446 shops examined in 
the Pharmaceutical Society survey, together with data for Boots Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Boots Ltd, Boots plc Archives, Boots Statistical Record for year to 31st March 1938;  other retailers, Royal Pharmaceutical 
Library Archives, IRA 1996.432, Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, `Report of the Committee of Enquiry, Part I (May 1939).’ 
 
Notes:  Figures for the survey were presented only as rankings. Figures marked with the same number of asterisks (in each column) are 
approximately the same order of magnitude. Boots had no optician’s department at this time (or classified sales in this category) and 
any optical sales in other departments can reasonably be assumed to be smaller than those in its classified categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
Turnover (£) 500-1000 1000-1500 1500-2000 2000-2500 2500-3000 3000-4000 4000-5000 Over 5000 Boots Ltd
Medicines
     Proprietary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
    Non-proprietary 2 2 2 3 3 2* 3** 2 2
Toiletries & chemists' 
sundries 3 3 3 2 2 3* 2** 3 3
Photographic 5 5 5 5* 4 4 4*** 4 5
Dispensing   
     NHI 4 4 4 4* 5 5 5*** 6 6
     Private 6 6 6 6 6 6 7* 5 7
Optical goods 8 8 8 8 8* 8 8 8 n.a.
Other goods 7 7 7 7 7* 7 6* 7 4
Shops in sample 37 134 94 67 37 51 15 11 1180
Table 4: Margins and expenses ratios for stores in the Census, and for Boots Ltd, for the 
year to 31st March 1938 
 
 
Turnover Average 
Turnover 
Gross 
Margin 
Expenses   Net 
Margin
   Stocks 
& fittings
Stores
£ £   Per cent of turnover__________________No.
500-1000 829             37.4 37.9 -0.5 47.3 93       
1000-1500 1,273          36.0 32.4 3.6 40.5 330     
1500-2000 1,743          35.1 29.8 5.3 37.3 266     
2000-2500 2,239          34.6 28.2 6.3 32.7 185     
2500-3000 2,710          35.1 26.9 8.1 33.1 116     
3000-4000 3,380          34.0 25.6 8.4 34.2 147     
4000-5000 4,377          33.9 26.2 7.7 30.3 57       
Over 5000 7,056          35.2 26.2 9.0 32.5 60       
Total (RPS Census) 2,280          34.9 28.0 6.9 35.0 1,254  
Boots (retail stores) 10,413        31.5 27.0 4.5 n.a. 1,180   
 
Source: Pharmaceutical Society survey, as for Table 2, Boots Ltd, Boots plc Archives, Box 
1167, detailed accounts and notes to the accounts for the year to 31st March 1938. 
 
Notes: Boots (all activities) includes wholesale sales to other retailers. 
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Table 5: A quartile analysis of sales, margins and expenses for a sample of 88 Boots stores 
over the year to 31st December 1937. 
 
Turnover per: Margins: Expenses:
Store Customer (d) Worker* Gross Net Pay-roll Rent Other Total
Q1 2,530   11.81 661       42.2 2.7 19.7 5.8 14.0 39.5
Q2 4,092   14.34 864       39.9 6.5 15.0 5.7 12.7 33.5
Q3 8,174   15.83 982       39.0 8.7 13.2 5.9 11.1 30.3
Q4 49,009 22.34 1,010    40.2 6.3 12.9 6.5 14.5 33.9
Full 
sample 15,571 19.76 974       40.1 6.5 13.3 6.3 13.9 33.6  
 
Sources and notes: Data include both retail and wholesale margins and costs. Each quartile 
comprises 22 stores (apart from the highest quartile, which has 21). * Estimated from store 
payroll expenses using an average payroll per person figure derived from wages and 
salaries for Boots’ retail section (from the Boots detailed accounts for the year ending 31st 
March 1938), divided by the number of branch store workers given in the Statistical Digest 
for the same year. 
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Table 6. Pairwise correlations between net margins and sales across size categories 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * p>0.01. None of the other correlations are significant even at the 10% level.  
 
 
S i z e (£,000s ) 1920s 1930s 
< 5 0 . 5 0 2 6 * 0 . 2 2 4 7 * 
5 - 1 0 0 . 0 7 0 5 0 . 3 5 9 9 * 
1 0 - 2 0 - 0 . 2 8 2 9 * - 0 . 0 4 5 4 
>2  0  - 0 . 3 0 3 6 * - 0 . 0 7 8 9 
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Figure 1. Distribution of the Boots sample stores by size categories (1923-1938) 
 
Sources: see text.  
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Figure 2: Relationship between Net Margin and Store Size for three bench mark years 
(1924, 1929, 1938) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: see text. 
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